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I. INTRODUCTION
D Othe special medical and social facts about AIDS warrant
stricter confidentiality policies for health care information
that identifies someone as having the disease or as being infected
with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)? Several federal and
state governmental entities have answered this question affirma-
tively.' Other states have considered legislative proposals that
would increase public access to health care information involving
AIDS. 2 There has been a spate of recently enacted Omnibus
1. Federal agencies expressing a concern for confidentiality have included a
Presidential Commission and the Centers for Disease Control. See REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS Epi-
DEMIC 126 (1988) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION] ("Rigorous mainte-
nance of confidentiality is considered critical to the success of the public health
endeavor to prevent the transmission and spread of HIV infection."); Provisional
Public Health Service Inter-Agency Recommendations for Screening Donated Blood and
Plasma for Antibody to the Virus Causing Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1, 3 (1985) ("Physicians, laboratory and nurs-
ing personnel, and others should recognize the importance of maintaining
confidentiality of positive test results.").
Some states have enacted legislation that strictly protects the confidentiality
of health care information pertaining to AIDS. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 381.609(2)(0(1)-(9) (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787
(McKinney Supp. 1989).
2. See, e.g., 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4802 (Vernon). These amendments
to the Real Estate License Act include provisions relating to HIV infection. Sec-
tion I5C provides:
[A] person who has actual knowledge that the previous or current occu-
pant of real property had or has AIDS, HIV-related illness, or HIV in-
fection shall provide that information to a potential purchaser or lessee
of the real property on receiving a specific request for the information
from the potential purchaser or lessee.
Id. at 4804.
One of the most publicized examples of attempts to expand public access to
HIV-related information was Proposition 102, described as the "Reporting Ex-
posure to AIDS Virus Initiative Statute." Sections 10, 11, and 14 of the pro-
posed statute authorized: (1) physicians and health officials to disclose HIV-
related information to a broad range of potential contacts, and (2) required per-
sons that have tested positive for HIV to report the names of any person from
whom the disease may have been contacted to local health officials within seven
days. Proposition 102 was defeated by a 2-1 margin in a referendum in Califor-
nia. See Californians Split on Referenda Seeking Contact Tracing and Criminal Tests,
AIDS LITIGATION REP. 1802, 1802 (Nov. 29, 1988). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
9-47 (Supp. 1989). For the text of this provision, see infra note 84.
872 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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AIDS legislation. 3 Regulation of access to health care informa-
tion about AIDS has been a central plank of this legislation.4
From these laws a consensus is emerging that may be viewed as
the "official" public policy on confidentiality and AIDS. With this
official public policy as a backdrop, in this article I examine the
role that confidentiality should play in governmental responses to
the AIDS epidemic.
Initially, I will examine the considerations that are commonly
involved in confidentiality issues with respect to general health
care information. Secondly, I propose an analytical model for
evaluating the soundness of confidentiality policies as applied to
health care information related to the diagnosis, testing and treat-
ment of AIDS patients. Finally, I apply this analysis to the resolu-
tion of selected confidentiality questions that have been
addressed in litigation and in recently enacted legislation. Using
this analytical model, I will conclude that some controversial con-
fidentiality issues actually present easy cases and others that ap-
pear to be easy cases may present, in fact, hard choices.
II. HEALTH CARE INFORMATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY
A. General Considerations
"Health care information" is a term that describes all of the
information that is acquired or generated about a patient or client
in the course of providing treatment. 5 "Confidentiality" is a term
that reflects a judgment about whether, and to what extent, health
3. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 199.21 (West 1989); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 381.609 (West Supp. 1989); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1989).
4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609 (West Supp. 1989). For the text of
this statute, see infra note 37. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787
(McKinney Supp. 1989). The New York statute's statement of legislative intent
is typical of this kind of legislation in stating:
In order to retain the full trust and confidence of persons at risk, the
state has an interest both in assuring that HIV related information is
not improperly disclosed and in having clear and certain rules for the
disclosure of such information. By providing additional protection of
the confidentiality of HIV related information, the legislature intends
to encourage the expansion of voluntary confidential testing for the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) so that individuals may come for-
ward, learn their health status, make decisions regarding the appropri-
ate treatment, and change the behavior that puts them and others at
risk of infection.
Id. § 2780 legislative intent.
5. See generall V ADVISORY PANEL ON PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIAILITY OF Hospi-
TAL RECORDS, AM. Hosp. ASS'N, GUIDELINES ON INSTITUTIONAL POLICIES FOR Dis-
CLOSURE OF MEDICAL RECORD INFORMATION (1979).
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care information should be made public. To say that information
is confidential is to make a normative statement that such infor-
mation ought to be non-public-that is, inaccessible to the pub-
lic. 6 Health care practitioners, patients and clients expect that
information acquired in the course of treatment will be kept confi-
dential. 7 This expectation about confidentiality reflects two inter-
related concerns. One is that confidentiality is essential to protect
the privacy of the patient; the other is that confidentiality is neces-
sary to preserve the integrity of the professional-patient relation-
ship. These two concerns are expressions of different intellectual
and legal traditions.
B. The Right to Privacy and the Preservation of the Integrity of the
Professional-Patient Relationship
The right to privacy is the product of our legal system's tradi-
tion of appellate courts building upon common law and constitu-
tional law foundations to declare and expound rights that persons
have against individuals and governmental entities. This tradi-
tion is grounded in evolving concepts of personhood and soci-
ety's notion of fairness and justice as reflected in everyday
discourse and traditional values of Anglo-American society.
Rights, like privacy, are viewed as an inextricable part of what it is
to be a person in our legal system." This view holds that privacy
is an intrinsic good that stands on its own. Privacy rights stand on
6. See generallv Turkington, Legal Protection for the Confidentiality of Health Care
Information in Pennsylvania: Patient and Client Access; Testimonial Privileges; Damage
Recoveryfor Unauthorized Extra-Legal Disclosure, 32 VILL. L. REV. 259, 265 (1987).
7. These expectations are reflected in the proscription against betrayal of
secrets found in the licensing and ethical standards of health professions and
medical records professionals. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASs'N, PRINCIPLES
OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957); Ethical Principles of Psychologists, 36 AMERICAN PSY-
CHOLOGISTS 633, 635-36 (June 1981); AMERICAN HOSPITAL Ass'N, HOSPITAL
MEDICAL RECORDS 5 (1972).
The limited research that has been conducted on the attitudes of patients
about expectations of confidentiality supports the view that confidentiality is ex-
pected and thought of as important for treatment. See, e.g., S. KNAPP & L.
VADECREEK, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MENTAL PROFESSIONS 30-33
(1987) (survey of studies about information acquired in psychotherapy).
8. For a useful evaluation of the respect for individual dignity basis for the
right to privacy, see PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY (F.
Schoeman ed. 1984). This view was first advanced by Warren and Brandeis in
their famous article. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). In the article the authors refer to privacy as part of a more general
right. The more general right was said to be the "right to the immunity of the
person,-the right to one's personality." Id. at 207. Dean Bloustein further de-
veloped these views several decades later. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
[Vol. 34: p. 871
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their own in the sense that the right to privacy has a force in legal
argument that ranges from either "trumping" other worthwhile
interests that are at stake in the case, or at least requiring that
privacy be given important weight in the decision-making
process.9
The integrity of the professional-patient relationship as a ba-
sis for confidentiality reflects a different intellectual tradition. It
is the tradition of science, empiricism, utilitarianism, and of the
health profession in providing treatment and care. From this per-
spective, confidentiality is an essential condition for treatment
and care because it promotes the unfettered exchange of informa-
tion between the patient and the professional.
Preserving the integrity of the professional-patient relation-
ship and protecting individual privacy are two positive values that
support the idea that there should be legal protection for the con-
fidentiality of health care information. In many instances these
positive values which support confidentiality collide with other
positive values that are promoted by public access to health care
information. Important governmental and private interests may
be furthered in particular situations by such access. Some of the
most important of these are: the interest in crime control,"' the
interest in truth seeking and the integrity of the fact-finding pro-
cess in civil and criminal proceedings, and the interest in public
safety and preserving life. ' 2 Legal protection for the confidential-
ity of health care information necessarily involves an accommoda-
tion of interests. Public and private interests that would be
9. The "trumping" metaphor is that of Professor Dworkin in his influential
work. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28 (1978). This section
reflects my prejudice that the essence of the right to privacy is grounded in what
Dworkin refers to as principle-based arguments that come from society's sense
of justice and morality. This tradition is essentially one of natural law. See
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (utilizing
classic natural law justification for recognition of a common law right to privacy).
See generally M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RICHTS
(1982); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
L.J. 221, 249-51 (1973).
10. See, e.g., In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury,
490 Pa. 143, 415 A.2d 73 (1980) (investigation of misappropriation of public
funds justified disclosure of information contained in medical records).
11. See, e.g., In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1970) (neither psychiatrist's nor patient's right to privacy violated by forced
disclosure of patient information in assult case initiated by patient).
12. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425,
551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (therapist has obligation to warn of pa-
tient's violent threats).
875
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furthered by disclosure must be weighed against the interests of
patient privacy and the preservation of the integrity of the profes-
sional-patient relationship.
C. HIV-Related Health Care Information
AIDS is currently described according to the stage of infec-
tion with HIV. When the infected individual's immune system is
sufficiently suppressed, an opportunity for certain infections is
provided, and physical symptoms and specific terminal illnesses
follow. A person may be infected for a lengthy period of time
before the virus sufficiently damages the immune system and the
symptoms which indicate AIDS are manifested. Many infected
persons are asymptomatic for long periods of time and may never
acquire the full-blown disease.' 3 Damage to the immune system
from the virus may facilitate the onslaught of other diseases in the
infected person. The focus of confidentiality concerns with AIDS
is on health care information that identifies an individual as in-
fected with HIV (seropositive test), or as diagnosed or treated for
AIDS or for one of the specific diseases commonly associated with
AIDS (Kaposi's sarcoma or Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, for
example).
In this article I employ the phrase "HIV-related information"
to refer to the generic information that should be considered as
the subject for confidentiality policies. This includes information
that an individual has been the subject of an HIV test or has HIV
infection. It also includes any other information that could rea-
sonably identify an individual as having one or more of the above
conditions. That a person had a prescription for AZT, a drug
used exclusively to treat AIDS, would be such information. One
of the issues that has prompted some disagreement within legisla-
tures is the scope of civil and criminal sanctions for unauthorized
disclosure of protected information. One approach, as illustrated
by the New York statute, is to focus regulations specifically on
information that is acquired during the course of treatment or
counseling.' 4 To implement this policy New York utilizes the
13. For an explanation of the criteria for and identification of AIDS, see
Redfield & Burke, HIV Infection: The Clinical Picture, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 90.
For a leading statement on the facts of transmission, see Francis & Chin, The
Prevention of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States: An Objective
Strategy for Medicine, Public Health, Business, and the Community, 257J. A.M.A. 1357
(1987).
14. See N.Y. PuB. HEALrH LAW § 2783 (McKinney Supp. 1989). The statute
provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall ... disclose, or compel an-
other person to disclose, or procure the disclosure of, confidential HIV related
876 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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concept of "Confidential HIV Related Information."' 15 "Confi-
dential" is employed to limit the information to that which is ac-
quired by or is in the possession of a health or social services
professional or is acquired by any person pursuant to a valid re-
lease. Other statutes do not make this distinction and provide for
sanctions if there is unauthorized disclosure by someone who has
not acquired the information in a treatment or counseling set-
ting. 16 I find this feature of the New York statute appealing.
However, for purposes of the limited issues that are discussed in
this article, the broader definition of "HIV-related information"
is the appropriate concept.
III. AN ANALYTICAL PARADIGM FOR DETERMINING APPROPRIATE
CONFIDENTIALITY POLICIES FOR HIV-RELATED
INFORMATION
I propose an analytical structure for evaluating confidential-
ity policies for HIV-related information. This proposal is norma-
tive in that it provides a way for determining what confidentiality
policies ought to be when relevant variables are evaluated and
weighed. The analysis also comports with many of the features of
judicial practices involved in the resolution of analogous confi-
dentiality issues and with legislative practices that are reflected in
AIDS legislation providing for confidentiality protection. I refer
to this approach as an analytical paradigm because it reflects what
I view as the best features of relevant judicial opinions and public
policy.
I propose that the scope of legal protection for the confiden-
tiality of health care information ought to be determined by the
careful evaluation and accommodation of: (1) the extent of the
loss of privacy that would occur if there were to be public disclo-
sure of the specific information; (2) the extent to which the integ-
rity of the professional-patient relationship requires immunity
from public access to the information; and (3) the extent to which
information . . . shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed five thousand
dollars for each occurrence." Id. § 2783(1)(b).
15. Id.
16. Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111i/-, para. 7309 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
("No person may disclose . . . the identity of any person upon whom a test is
performed, or the results of such a test. ... ) (emphasis added) with CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.219 (West Supp. 1989) (providing for civil pen-
alty up to $1000 for the disclosure of subject-identifying blood test results by
anyone responsible for care and treatment of test subject) (emphasis added).
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important governmental and private interests would be furthered
by disclosure of such information.
A. HIV-Related Information and Privacy
The first factor to be evaluated is the risk of loss of privacy
that would result from a breach of confidentiality of HIV-related
information. Most health care information contains much that, if
publicly disclosed, would constitute a significant invasion of pri-
vacy. Information about someone's physical condition embodies
the most basic subject of privacy. Similarly, one's intimate per-
sonal and family relationships and sexual experiences, real or
fantasized, are recognized as calling forth our most fundamental
desires for privacy and secrecy. Nonconsensual publication of
such information violates our sense of self-respect, human dignity
and personhood.17 Disclosure of this highly personal and inti-
mate information may damage our reputation and so affect
others' perceptions of us that it may cause financial ruin and de-
stroy or permanently alter friendships and other associations.
The extent to which specific types of health care information
implicate privacy is a by-product of two interrelated factors: the
intrinsic and the consequential features of the information. By
intrinsic features, I am referring to the degree of intimacy of the
information.' "Consequential features" refers to the potential
for harmful consequences to the subject if information is dis-
17. In an often quoted passage from a significant privacy case, Judge
Hamely of the Ninth Circuit aptly noted: "We cannot conceive of a more basic
subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed
figure from the view of strangers and particularly strangers of the opposite sex,
is compelled by elementary self respect and personal dignity." York v. Story,
324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964). See also
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (em-
ployee's medical records containing sensitive, personal facts entitled to privacy
protection; but upon showing of governmental interest, disclosure may be re-
quired); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (constitutional
right to privacy in medical records not relinquished by virtue of incarceration).
18. See generally Rural Hous. Alliance v. Department of Agric., 498 F.2d 73
(D.C. Cir. 1974). Rural Housing is a federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
case in which a U.S. Department of Agriculture report on discrimination in gov-
ernmental housing in Florida was sought by a public interest group. The Act
was enacted in 1966, and generally provides access by any person to information
that is in federal governmental agency records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The
Act adopts a presumption in favor of disclosure and places the burden on the
agency to demonstrate that exemptions under the Act are applicable before the
information will be nondisclosable. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The major vehicle for
protecting privacy interests under the Act is § 552(b)(6). Medical records epito-
mize the type of information that is intended to be protected by this exemption
because of the powerful privacy concerns involved. Section 552(b)(6) reads in
pertinent part: "This section does not apply to matters that are . . .personnel
878 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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closed. Information may not be intimate, yet be "highly per-
sonal" in the sense that the subject may choose not to make such
information available to the public because of a reasonable fear
that disclosure would bring about harmful consequences. One
example of highly personal information would be the fact that
someone had been arrested or had otherwise encountered the
criminal process. Even though such information is, to some ex-
tent public, and although it may not say much, if anything, about
the health or personal or family relations of the subject, its disclo-
sure could raise serious privacy concerns. 19
Attitudes about health care information influence whether
adverse consequences will occur to the subject of the information
as a result of disclosure. These attitudes may reflect both rational
and irrational concerns about the extent to which a particular
condition threatens others. Misconceptions about illness and dis-
ease are the product of the social forces that contribute to atti-
tudes generally. Over the last several decades, media accounts
have undoubtedly contributed to prevalent attitudes about con-
temporary contagious and terminal diseases.
Susan Sontag has described the influence of metaphors ex-
pressed in public accounts of disease upon the perception by
others of victims of those diseases. 2° She argues that these meta-
phors contributed to misperceptions regarding cancer. Sontag
initially examined attitudes and perceptions about persons with
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Id.
Because § 552(b)(6) requires courts to sort out information on the basis of
privacy values, § 552(b)(6) FOIA cases involve one of the most extensive and
valuable discussions on the subject in our legal system. In Rural Housing the
court noted that the requested report disclosed information about "marital sta-
tus, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of children, medical conditions,
welfare payments, alcoholic consumption, [and] family fights," and that such in-
formation involved "intimate details" of those identified in the report. Rural
Housing, 498 F.2d at 77. See also Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133,
137 (3d Cir. 1974) (disclosure of name and address list would constitute clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy in part because disclosure could subject those
on list to unsolicited phone calls and perhaps offensive mail).
19. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1468 (1989).
Section 552(b)(7)(C) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) excludes from
disclosure records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes "to
the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information
... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988). In Reporters Committee, the Court
held that this section precluded disclosure of FBI "rap sheets" under FOIA be-
cause the compilation of information in these arrest records implicated signifi-
cant privacy interests of the subject. Reporters Committee, 109 S. Ct. at 1485.
20. See generally S. SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1989); S. SONTAG,
ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978).
879
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cancer during the time when increased incidence of the disease
was receiving much publicity but treatment was less sophisticated
and successful than today. Currently, "cancer" is a term that
probably does not generate the fear and social stigma that it did a
decade or so ago. Sontag suggests that the metaphoric imagery
of public accounts of AIDS has now distracted the public some-
what from its cancer phobia. Yet the intrinsic and consequential
features of health care information about cancer have produced
laws providing for special protection for the privacy of cancer pa-
tients. 2 1 Similarly, concern over patient privacy with respect to
information about treatment for drug and alcohol abuse and
mental health problems has produced federal and state laws pro-
viding for the most stringent confidentiality for such
information. 22
B. Medical and Social Facts About AIDS
Intrinsically and consequentially, publication of HIV-related
information constitutes the most serious invasion of privacy. This
conclusion inescapably follows from both the medical and social
facts about the disease.
Numerous claims about AIDS are spoken of as "facts" in the
public discourse on AIDS. The nature of these claims differ both
in the evidence and methodological reasoning used to support
them and in the extent to which there is disagreement or consen-
sus in the scientific community about the conclusions that are to
be drawn from the relevant evidence. The claim that HIV causes
the disease is supported by purely scientific methodology and lab-
oratory observations and is embraced overwhelmingly in the sci-
entific community. Claims about modes of transmission are
based upon general data and the inferences that epidemiologists
make from such data by using the methodology of their science.
There is now general agreement by epidemiologists that HIV is
21. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2402 (McKinney 1985) ("The reports
of cancer cases made pursuant to the provisions of this article shall not be di-
vulged or made public so as to disclose the identity of any person to whom they
relate, by any person, except in so far as may be authorized in the sanitary
code.").
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (Supp. V 1987). This statute provides:
Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis or treatment of any
patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of
any program or activity relating to alcoholism or alcohol abuse educa-
tion, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research, which is conducted
... by any department or agency of the United States shall ... be
confidential ....
880 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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not transmitted by casual contact. Claims about the behavior of
those who are infected and the behavior of persons toward those
who are perceived to be infected are supported by the data and
methodology of social scientists. Although these claims about be-
havior are supported mostly by surveys and indirect observations
rather than by the more empirical techniques available to medical
science, they are predicates of social policy that are as essential to
the formulation of that policy as are claims of medical facts.
Although there is a great deal that is now known about AIDS,
some of the epidemiological and medical facts about AIDS are
very fluid and uncertain. Two very recent developments illustrate
this. One is the preliminary studies that strongly suggest that
AZT may be effective in retarding the growth of HIV at early
stages of entry into the body.23 The other is the discovery that in
rare instances the body does not seroconvert for as long as thirty-
six months after HIV infection. 24 Claims about the medical fea-
tures and social implications of AIDS greatly influence public pol-
icy on confidentiality and AIDS. I refer to these claims in a
general sense as medical and social facts.
The most basic and stable current medical facts about the
disease are: it is incurable, communicable and terminal; it is
caused by a virus that may not be eliminated once it is in some-
one's system; and the virus is primarily transmitted by anal and
vaginal sexual intercourse, intravenous drug use with contami-
nated syringes, transfusions of contaminated blood or blood de-
rivatives, and from mother to child during pregnancy or at
birth.2 5 It is difficult to imagine information more intimate than
the fact that someone has become infected with HIV. The fact
that someone has an infection that is communicable, incurable
and almost certainly fatal, reflects upon that person's most basic
sense of identity and security.
AIDS is also a social and cultural phenomenon. Some of the
social and cultural features of AIDS are expressed in behavior and
23. See F-D-C Reports: The Pink Sheet, Aug. 7, 1989, at T&G2. The National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease conducted a double-blind, placebo-
controlled study involving 713 HIV-infected persons. Study participants ad-
vancing to ARC or AIDS totalled 50 (36 from the placebo group and 14 from the
AZT treatment group). Id. The study was said to have demonstrated for the
first time that AZT is effective against early symptomatic HIV infection. Id.
24. See Imagawa, Lee, Wolinsky et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I
Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged Periods, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1458 (1988); Silent HIV Infections, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1487
(1988).
25. See Francis & Chin, supra note 13.
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attitudes about the disease. These social facts provide the best
evidence of the dramatic consequential feature of HIV-related
information.
Commentary in this symposium and in numerous other fo-
rums has demonstrated, by pointing to a variety of accumulating
evidence, that persons who are infected with the virus or suffer
from the full-blown disease have been subjected to intolerance,
ostracism, discrimination and violence.2 3 These are basic and
fundamentally important social facts about AIDS. Several factors
undoubtedly contribute to the stigmas with which this disease is
associated.
AIDS is the first full-blown transnational plague2 7 of the elec-
tronic age. The disease entered our society with stealth and dis-
patch at a time when world-wide interconnected information
technology was maturing. The disease has been identified for less
than a decade. It has been known for only six to seven years that
HIV may be transmitted by blood transfusions. During the early
phases of the public discussion about the disease (the years from
1981 to 1984-85), the fact that HIV was found to survive in a
number of body fluids produced a number of alarming, highly
publicized theories of transmission. The virus was found in
blood, semen, vaginal fluids, breast milk, saliva, tears and urine.
While the epidemiological evidence was developing, logical infer-
ences concerning transmission were freely disseminated and be-
came ensconced in the public consciousness. If HIV could live in
saliva, then the virus must be transmittable by exchanging saliva
26. Testimony and reports on incidents of adverse actions taken against
persons that were perceived to have AIDS have been so often noted that to sum-
marize them would be to repeat what has been said and is found in numerous
books, articles, governmental reports and findings. The Report of The Presi-
dential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic encapsu-
lated this by noting that "[a]t virtually every Commission hearing, witnesses
have attested to discrimination's occurrence and its serious repercussions for
both the individual who experiences it and for this nation's efforts to control the
epidemic." See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 119. In addition to
the incidents cited in the symposium article by Mary Dunlap, (see Dunlap, AIDS
and Discrimination in the United States. Reflections on the Nature of Prejudice in a Virus,
34 VILL. L. REV. 909 (1989)), the following publications contain references that
support the position on social facts that the analysis in this article proceeds
upon: W. BANTA, AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 4-15 (1988); Brandt, AIDS: From
Social History to Social Policy, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 147, 152-57 (E.
Fee & D. Fox eds. 1988). See also NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, Anti-Gay
Violence, Victimization & Defamation in 1986, attributing part of the increase in re-
ported incidents of violence against gays to the AIDS epidemic.
27. For an illuminating discussion of the concept of plague and its relation
to illness and disease and AIDS, see S. SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1989)
at 44-60.
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or sharing eating utensils. If HIV were found in tears, than per-
haps it was an air-borne transmittable virus. Since it was found in
blood, perhaps it could be transmitted by mosquito bites or by an
infected toilet seat.2 8
Considerable epidemiological data has been accumulated
since the disease was first recognized in 1981. This data has con-
vinced the mainstream scientific community that the virus is only
transmitted by contaminated blood (either in the course of a
transfusion or via contaminated drug paraphernalia), perinatally,
and by anal or vaginal sexual intercourse. Yet the attention paid
to the medical literature's current theory of transmission has not
been equal to the early publicity. Like the retraction to a defama-
tory statement, dissemination of updated, more factually-founded
theories of transmission has not debunked the sensational conjec-
tures that still shape the attitudes of many in our society. These
lingering and pervasive misconceptions about transmission have
coalesced with prejudice against homosexuals, racism, increasing
intolerance of illegal drug use, and fear for personal safety to pro-
duce hostile and abusive behavior against those with AIDS and
those perceived as being likely to contract AIDS.
Given these social facts, the most significant consequential
features must be assigned to HIV-related information. While the
presence of the virus threatens the physical life of the infected
person, public disclosure of the fact of infection may destroy the
subject as a "person" by denying that individual those social
rights and privileges that are essential to personhood.
C. Preserving the Integrity of the Professional-Patient Relationship:
The Special Role of Confidentiality in Diagnosis, Treatment
and Disease Prevention
The second factor to be considered in the proposed analyti-
cal framework is the interest in preserving the professional-pa-
tient relationship in the context of the AIDS epidemic. One of
the purposes of protecting the confidentiality of any health care
information is to insure the free flow of information between the
parties by preserving the integrity of the professional-patient rela-
tionship. Preventing public access to the information acquired
during the existence of the professional-patient relationship is
considered essential to effective health care. The relative impor-
tance of preserving the integrity of the professional-patient rela-
28. See generally W. BANTA, supra note 26, at 7-8; Francis & Chin, supra note
883
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tionship may vary according to two factors: (1) the role of
communications in treatment, and (2) the subjective concerns and
expectations of privacy that the patient has about the information.
If the information communicated is crucial to effective treatment
and the patient has strong concerns and expectations about pri-
vacy, the greatest value attaches to preserving the integrity of the
relationship. The paradigm would be information about treat-
ment for substance abuse and information related to mental ill-
ness. Some of the most stringent confidentiality laws have been
enacted for such information .2 9 These expressions of public pol-
icy are based upon the proposition that special legal protection is
mandated to protect confidentiality where the free exchange of
certain information is essential to diagnosis and treatment and a
patient is concerned about the public disclosure of that
information.
Because of the previously identified medical and social facts
about AIDS, insuring the free flow of information between the
patient and the professional plays a special and important role in
current efforts to manage the epidemic. The present lack of a
cure for AIDS shifts the primary focus of public policy away from
treatment to protecting public health through reducing transmis-
sion of the virus. The major avenue of transmission appears to be
through persons who are asymptomatic and unaware that they are
infected. This, combined with the fact that infected persons may
avoid transmission by altering their behavior, has caused volun-
tary testing to become an important piece of national health strat-
egy to reduce transmission of HIV. 30 Voluntary testing promotes
the policy of reducing transmission and protecting public health
by informing infected persons of their infection so they may alter
their behavior.
The case of Gaetan Dugas is a highly publicized piece of an-
ecdotal evidence that raises questions as to the soundness of the
assertion that positive behavior patterns will result from knowl-
edge of HIV status. 3' Knowledge of HIV status may be of limited
use in altering the behavior patterns of drug addicts. Addiction
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (Supp. V 1987). See also generally Turk-
ington, supra note 6, at 346 (discussing Mental Health Procedure and Alcohol
Abuse Control Acts).
30. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 119-40.
31. Dugas has been depicted as "Patient Zero" for purportedly spreading
HIV across North America and for deliberately engaging in high-risk sexual ac-
tivity with a large number of persons who later became infected, even after he
knew that he was infected. Dugas' escapades are graphically narrated in Randy
Shilts' popular book, And The Band Played On (1988), but may have been of less
884 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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may compel persons to continue to share needles or to engage in
prostitution as a means of obtaining drugs even though they
know themselves to be HIV seropositive.3 2 On the other hand,
studies based upon surveys of homosexual and bisexual men that
compared the behavior patterns of those that had been tested for
HIV with men that did not know their HIV status provide impor-
tant support for the claim that knowledge of seropositive HIV sta-
tus is likely to produce changes in behavior that reduce the risk of
transmission.33
As progress continues toward a cure or effective ways to
manage the disease, voluntary testing may provide carriers with
an opportunity to seek available treatment by identifying the in-
fection at early stages. Recent studies have strongly suggested
that AZT retards replication of the virus in many infected persons
if taken at early stages of the infection. 34 This important develop-
ment will undoubtedly result in a greater interest in testing by
persons that perceive themselves to be at risk.
The official public policy on confidentiality and AIDS links
increasing knowledge of HIV status via voluntary testing with the
need to provide strict confidentiality protection. This linkage is
made by the assumption that a significant number of persons will
be unwilling to be tested unless they believe that the results will
be confidential. This is a reasonable assumption about the atti-
tudes and behavior of persons that perceive themselves to be, or
that are in fact, at risk of infection. There has been much public-
ity about breaches of confidentiality of HIV-related information
and the social harm that such disclosure has caused to the in-
fected persons. There also has been much publicity on increased
violence and discrimination against gays that is tied to fear of
AIDS. Given the large number of persons that typically have ac-
cess to health records in treatment facilities, a concern about
breaches of confidentiality is certainly not unwarranted.3 5
Claims about the effects on behavior of attitudes about confi-
dentiality are difficult to verify. Research does provide support
epidemiological significance than Shits implies. See Dunlap, supra note 26, at
910 n.6, 919 n.35.
32. See Report of the Workgroup on Prevention: Information, Education, and Behav-
ior Change, PUB. HEALTH REP., Nov. 1988, at 19.
33. See generally Tauer, AIDS: Toward an Ethical Public Policy, 1988 BIOMEDI-
CAL ETHICS REVIEWS 79, 85-87.
34. See F-D-C Reports: The Pink Sheet, supra note 23.
35. See Tauer, supra note 33, at 83 (more than 100 people may have access
to medical records in a typical American hospital).
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for the proposition that fear of what will happen if the fact of in-
fections is known will inhibit someone from being voluntarily
tested. A recent study showed that gay males were more willing
to use a totally anonymous testing system than one that was confi-
dential but used the subjects' names.3 6 On balance, the evidence
does support the position that protecting the confidentiality of
HIV-related information will encourage voluntary testing and
provide individuals with the opportunity to change high-risk
behavior.
It is ironic that because of the special medical and social facts
about AIDS, a combination of arguments coalesce to support pro-
viding strict confidentiality protection for HIV-related health care
information. In respect to other kinds of health care information,
these same arguments some times face off against each other.
Confidentiality not only furthers the intrinsic good of the right to
privacy and the pragmatic good of treatment and diagnosis, but
also the pragmatic good of protecting the public safety by limiting
transmission of the virus.3 7
36. Fehrs, Fleming, Foster et al., Trial of Anonymous Versus Confidential Human
Immunodeficiency Iirus Testing, LANCET, Aug. 13, 1988, at 379. In 1988, the state
of Illinois experienced a 25% decline in the number of marriage licenses issued
and a mass exodus of couples out of the state to marry during the initial year of
its mandatory HIV testing program. Wilkerson, Illinois Legislature Repeals Require-
ment for PrenuptialAIDS Tests, N.Y. Times,June 25, 1989, at 12, col. 1. Although
factors such as the cost and delay of the test undoubtedly contributed to this
phenomena, concern over the risk of public access to test results may have also
influenced the behavior of prospective marriage applicants. Id. The legislature
has since repealed the mandatory testing requirement. Id.
37. An example of legislation that reflects this reasoning and promotes
confidentiality as a central plank in public policy responses to AIDS is found in
the statement of legislative intent in the recently enacted Florida statute which
states:
The Legislature finds that the use of tests designed to reveal a con-
dition indicative of human immunodeficiency virus infection can be a
valuable tool in protecting the public health. The Legislature finds that
despite existing laws, regulations, and professional standards which re-
quire or promote the informed, voluntary and confidential use of tests
designed to reveal human immunodeficiency virus infection, many
members of the public are deterred from seeking such testing because
they misunderstand the nature of the test or fear that test results will be
disclosed without their consent. The Legislature finds that the public
health will be served by facilitating informed, voluntary, and confiden-
tial use of tests designed to detect human immunodeficiency virus
infection.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609 (West Supp. 1989).
886 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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D. Governmental and Private Interests Asserted on Behalf of
Compromising Confidentiality of HIV-Related
Information
The third factor to be considered in the proposed analytical
model for evaluating the treatment of HIV-related information is
the strength of the interests asserted, either governmental or pri-
vate, in favor of compromising confidentiality. A broad range of
interests are asserted to justify breaches of confidentiality. In this
section I engage in a general discussion of two interests: the in-
terest in preventing physical harm to others and the interest in
preventing emotional harm to others. In the last section I discuss
a third interest: that of preserving the integrity of the truth-seek-
ing process of courts in civil suits where HIV-related information
is sought. A comprehensive' evaluation of the whole spectrum of
competing interests that may be implicated is beyond the scope of
this article. However, I do find it interesting and worthy of men-
tion that much of the public policy that has addressed the impor-
tant question of the extent to which the interest in research
warrants access to information is consistent with the analysis in
this article. The importance of protecting personal privacy and in
maintaining trust in the professional-client relationship is recog-
nized by requiring the researcher to get the informed consent of
the subject or by limiting access to HIV-related information to
research that does not identify the subject.38
1. The Interest in Preventing Physical Harm to Others
Perhaps the strongest basis for compromising the confidenti-
ality of health care information is when disclosure is essential to
the protection of persons against physical harm and loss of life.
There is a tradition in moral philosophy traceable at least to John
Stuart Mill that views preventing harm to others as having pri-
macy over personal autonomy and privacy rights. : 9 Considerable
precedent exists for requiring disclosure of confidential health
38. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.025(5)(a)(10) (West 1989) (HIV test re-
sults may be disclosed to researchers affiliated with health care providers if writ-
ten assurance is given that identity of subject will not be disclosed unless
informed consent is obtained from subject).
39. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). Mill argued that preventing harm to
others is the only basis for coercive actions against mature competent persons. I
do not take a position in this article on the question of whether preventing harm
is the exclusive justification for breaches of confidentiality. For an interesting
discussion of how Mills' harm principle supports imposing duties on infected
persons to warn sexual partners, see Steinbock, Harming, Wronging, and AIDS,
1988 BIOMEDICAL ETHICS REVIEws 27.
887
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care information to prevent physical harm. Physicians are rou-
tinely required by statutes to report both terminal conditions (like
cancer) and contagious diseases (like syphilis and tuberculosis) to
health departments. 40  Health departments in turn engage in
"contact tracing"-identifying and informing persons who are at
significant risk that they have been exposed to a contagious dis-
ease and should be tested. Common law duties have been im-
posed on physicians to disclose the existence of contagious
diseases to spouses and family members. 4 1
Assuming that in appropriate circumstances the interest in
preventing physical harm to others and protecting the life of
others ought to outweigh personal privacy and the integrity of the
professional-client relationship, the facts about transmission of
HIV are crucial to determining whetlfer in a particular case this
interest is significantly implicated. As previously discussed, the
best evidence demonstrates that HIV is transmitted only by inti-
mate sexual contact, contaminated blood and perinatally. 42 The
40. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3125 (West 1979) (physicians,
nurses, clergymen, attendants, co-habitants and others required to report fact of
infectious or contagious disease to health officer); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 143.04,
143.07 (West 1989) (any person, particularly a physician, is required to report
communicable diseases, particularly sexually transmitted diseases, to local
health officer); see generally Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the
Conflicting Physician's Duties of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confi-
dentiality, 76 GEO. L.J. 169 (1987).
41. See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 612 (1921) (physician
has duty to exercise reasonable care when advising family about typhoid fever);
Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (physician
has duty to inform patient's family of risks and precautions associated with con-
tagious disease); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (physi-
cian has duty to inform family of infectious nature of scarlet fever). See generally
Note, supra note 40, at 176-87.
42. As the previous authors have pointed out, there is a considerable con-
sensus among epidemiologists in the scientific community about modes of trans-
mission for HIV. There is only hard evidence to support the view that HIV is
transmitted in three main ways: (1) through intimate sexual contact; (2) through
parenteral exposure to contaminated blood (contaminated blood entering the
body through breaks in the skin as in IV drug use or in transfusions); and
(3) from mother to child in utero or at the time of delivery. Myths that HIV is
transmittable by other means, flow, I think, from speculation and unwarranted
inferences from the fact that the virus has been isolated from blood, semen,
saliva, tears, breast milk and urine. From the fact that HIV is present in these
body fluids and excretions, early speculation was that HIV could be transmitted
from exchange of body fluids and casual contact.
As more facts about the occurrence and distribution of the disease accumu-
lated, the evidence that transmission does not occur through casual contact be-
came compelling. The major evidence was the absence of any clearly
demonstrable cases of transmission to persons living in the household of some-
one infected with the virus by other than the three modes described above. If
the virus were transmittable through casual contact, members of households of
18
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interests in preventing physical harm and protecting life ought
not to be regarded as reasonable justification for disclosure of
HIV-related information unless the recipient of the information is
at significant risk of infection and disclosure will significantly re-
duce or eliminate that risk.4 3
2. The Interest in Preserving Mental Equanimity and Preventing
Emotional Harm to Others
Some legislative proposals for requiring disclosure of HIV-
related information appear to be ultimately designed to provide
the recipient of the information with peace of mind about the risk
of infection. Examples of this are proposals to require the testing
and disclosure of HIV status of employees to employers, and of
homeowners to prospective buyers. Given the known facts about
transmission, these proposals are not justified as efforts to pre-
vent physical harm to others, but only to provide peace of mind.
There is neither much precedent nor many persuasive arguments
for compromising the values that are furthered by protecting the
confidentiality of HIV-related information where the primary jus-
tification for doing so is to prevent anxiety or other forms of emo-
tional distress about the possibility of being exposed to HIV. The
instances where tort law provides protection for mental equanim-
ity nearly always involve situations where there is affirmative con-
duct. Where the conduct is deliberate or reckless, it must be
demonstrably of no social value and cause serious emotional dis-
tress. 44 Where the conduct is negligent, the conduct must create
infected persons would have been infected because exchange of fluids does oc-
cur with kissing, mutual use of toothbrushes, eating utensils and other non-sex-
ual contact. See Fischl, Dickinson, Scott et al., Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners,
Children, and Household Contacts of Adults with AIDS, 257 J. A.M.A. 640 (1987);
Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV-IH/LAV Infection
to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral
Candidiasis, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 344 (1986). In the Friedland study, one
household member became infected, but the authors concluded that transmis-
sion likely occurred from mother to child during infancy rather than through any
casual contact. Id.
Several theories have been suggested for explaining the absence of evi-
dence of cases of transmission by exchanging saliva: (1) HIV is not found in the
saliva of many infected persons; (2) there is insufficient concentration of HIV
particles in saliva for transmission; and (3) chemicals in the saliva inhibit
transmission.
43. SeeJ. FEINBERG, HARM T1O OTHERS (1988). Feinberg is a leading moral
philosopher and commentator on Mills' harm principle. The harm principle
comes into play when human action causes harm or creates an unreasonable risk
of harm to others. Id. at 11.
44. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress allows for recov-
ery for purely emotional harm without manifestation of physical injury; however,
889
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clearly defined risks of physical harm, and the emotional distress
generally must be accompanied by physical injury.45 Marc Chris-
tian's successful lawsuit against the estate of Rock Hudson may be
an appropriate use of tort remedies for non-disclosure of HIV sta-
tus. 46 But in that case, recovery for anxiety over risk of infection
was based upon an allegation of wrongful affirmative conduct that
involved a serious risk of transmission of the virus to the person
claiming to have a right to know of someone's HIV status. Where
fear over the risk of infection is irrational because of erroneous
assumptions about transmission or because of prejudice about
high risk groups, a policy that requires that confidentiality be
breached in order to reduce such fears places the imprimatur of
society behind these fears and prejudices. Such a policy hinders
efforts to manage the epidemic. For these reasons I take the posi-
tion that the interest in preventing anxiety and mental distress
about the risk of being infected with HIV is not a sufficient per se
justification for requiring the disclosure of the fact of infection.
recovery is only allowed if serious emotional distress was caused by conduct on
the part of the defendant that is "outrageous" within the meaning of the tort.
Outrageous conduct is that which is beyond what is tolerated in a civilized soci-
ety. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
45. Although there have been many changes in the requirements for recov-
ery in negligence actions where the gravamen of the claim is for emotional harm,
recovery is still generally denied unless the plaintiff is at risk of physical harm
from the defendant's conduct and there is physical manifestation of the emo-
tional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436, 436A (1965); see
also Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (risk of
physical harm not necessary, but physical manifestation of harm is required);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)
(no cause of action for unintended harm sustained solely as result of injuries
inflicted directly upon another regardless of relationship and proximity to
incident).
When there is a duty owed in negligence due to the affirmative conduct of
the defendant, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have been at risk of physical
harm. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (allowing cause of action for negligent infliction of severe
emotional distress); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372
N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (recovery for emotional harm allowed to plaintiff subjected
directly to the negligent act when evidence shows causation and substantial
harm).
This limited precedent does not support general disclosure of health care
information to members of the public that have real but unfounded fears of be-
ing endangered. This precedent does have some relevance to the question of
disclosure to sexual partners discussed later in this article. See infra notes 76-84
and accompanying text.
46. See Christian v. Sheft, No. C574153, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 21,
1989) (lover successfully stied estate of late actor on grounds that actor and
personal secretary withheld news of actor's AIDS infection while sexual relation-
ship continued).
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IV. EASY AND HARD CASES USING THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
To illustrate this analytical model, specific confidentiality
questions will now be examined. First, I will examine "easy"
cases. Easy cases are those cases where there is not a true conflict
between positive interests. These false cases of having to make
hard choices may occur in two ways: (1) the important interest
furthered by disclosure may be furthered without invading the
privacy of the infected person or adversely affecting the integrity
of the professional-patient relationship, or (2) disclosure will not
in fact further the interest and will seriously invade privacy and
compromise the integrity of the professional-patient relationship.
I suggest that in such cases the only responsible public policy is to
protect the confidentiality of such information. Finally, I look at
the issue of notification of known sexual partners and needle-
sharing partners. I conclude that this turns out to be a hard case
because there is a true conflict between values supporting confi-
dentiality and important governmental and private interests.
A. Easy Cases
1. Disclosure to Subject of HIV Test and to Persons Authorized to
Receive Information by the Subject.- The Need for Informed
Consent and Written Authorization for Release
The preceding analysis strongly supports the adoption of
three policies in the information gathering and dissemination ac-
tivities involved with testing for HIV: (1) that testing not occur
without the informed consent of the subject; (2) that the subject
have the right to release testing information to whomever they
choose; and (3) that the release be contained in a written docu-
ment specifically limiting the extent of disclosure and specifically
precluding further disclosure.
The common law right to self-determination is the central
principle of the evolving law of informed consent. 47 Legally valid
47. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.) (recognizing fundamen-
tal concept that every adult of sound mind has right to decide what shall be done
with his own body), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). See also Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (informed consent case in-
volving undisclosed potential complication which was not integral part of proce-
dure, but merely a known risk); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979)
(liability for failure to obtain informed consent when adverse consequences not
made known to plaintiff do in fact occur and cause injury); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (involving informed consent in malpractice
action where patient suffered radiation burns); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d
596, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (physician has duty to disclose ramifications of a
course of conduct, governed by principles of negligence for breach of duty).
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consent to medical procedures must be voluntary and fully in-
formed. Physicians now clearly have a duty to fully inform pa-
tients of risks and alternatives to proposed medical procedures.
The theoretical basis of the right to self-determination is in the
notion that autonomy about choices involving fundamental mat-
ters is intrinsic to personhood. Fundamental matters about which
persons have the privacy of choice include whether to undergo a
physically invasive medical procedure and the choice as to who
shall have access to intimate and highly personal information
about them.48 Consent is the manifestation of the right to self-
determination because it conclusively demonstrates that persons
have decided for themselves. Informed consent is an essential
component of the patient's right to privacy.
Whether there has been informed consent to a medical pro-
cedure becomes an issue when there has been assent to the proce-
dure by the subject. This assent becomes legally valid consent if
fully informed and voluntary. Similarly, the question of informed
consent for HIV testing sometimes arises when there has been
consent to the drawing of blood for a medical procedure or exam-
ination and the test for HIV is performed without first informing
the patient.4'9
Under these circumstances some argue that informed indi-
vidualized consent is not necessary because the consent to per-
form blood tests and other diagnostic procedures is implied from
the general consent required of the patient. This argument relies
upon a dis-analogy, namely that testing for HIV is like testing for
cholesterol or other conditions in the blood that involve no sig-
nificant risk of adverse consequences to the subject if the condi-
tion is known. Comparing testing for cholesterol with testing for
HIV is like comparing firecrackers to the hydrogen bomb. With
the potential for discrimination and other adverse social conse-
quences that exist for persons who test positive for HIV, the deci-
sion to be tested for the virus is an important one. The decision
is more analogous to choosing whether to undergo an invasive
48. For a more philosophical discussion of the theory of informed consent,
see generally Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 237 (1974) (discussing coer-
cive elements of prison and psychiatric hospital settings on informed consent to
medical experiments); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informied Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw.
UL. REV. 628 (1970) (discussing evolution of doctrine of informed consent).
49. See Doe v. Conly, Civ. No. CV-88-0486, slip op. (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
1988) (blood sample, taken for diagnosis of rash, tested for HIV without consent
of subject).
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medical procedure with inherent risks of permanent physical
harm.
The weakness of the implied consent argument is fully ex-
posed when the government requires employees to submit to
mandatory testing for HIV. The drawing of a person's blood to
test for HIV, like the drawing of blood for alcohol tests or the
capturing of urine for drug testing, would seem to clearly be a
"search" under both the state and federal constitutions. 50 As
such, either consent to the search or a demonstration of strong
overriding governmental interests is necessary for the test to be
constitutional. In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Re-
tardation,5' mandatory blood testing of employees of the Eastern
Nebraska Human Services Agency (ENHSA) for tuberculosis,
hepatitis B, and HIV was found to be an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Federal Constitution. 52
Following this reasoning, it is difficult to comprehend how a
test by the government for HIV may so significantly affect per-
sonal privacy as to be considered a fourth amendment search
while a test for HIV in the private sector by a health care facility
or employer does not involve a sufficiently fundamental matter to
trigger the common law right to self-determination and require
individualized informed consent. The personal privacy interests
of the subject of an HIV test are too significant to test without
informed consent. Surreptitious testing for HIV status may also
threaten the trust that is essential for the free flow of information
between the professional and client; persons may be reluctant to
50. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989)
(drug testing program not designed to serve ordinary law enforcement needs
requires balancing of public interest in program against individual's privacy con-
cerns); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)
(collection and subsequent chemical analysis of urine samples are searches that
must meet reasonableness requirement of fourth amendment).
51. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
52. Id. The court found that a policy requiring mandatory testing of the
employees for hepatitis B and HIV was not justified at its inception and consti-
tuted a search for purposes of the fourth amendment. Id. at 250. Regarding
HIV testing, the court stated that
[t]he policy was prompted by concerns about the AIDS virus, formu-
lated with little or erroneous medical knowledge, and is a constitution-
ally impermissible reaction to a devastating disease with no known
cure. The risk of transmission of disease from the staff to the clients ...
is minuscule, trivial, extremely low, extraordinarily low, theoretical, and
approaches zero. Such a risk does not justify the implementation of
such a sweeping policy which ignores and violates the staff members'
constitutional rights.
Id. at 251.
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interface with the health care professional if they think that secret
testing for HIV status may occur.
The doctrine of informed consent presupposes that a compe-
tent patient, and not the treating professional, has the right to
decide whether it is best for the patient to participate in a medical
procedure. The requirement of informed consent is, in, this
sense, essentially anti-paternalistic. Therefore, surreptitious test-
ing for HIV in order to protect the patient from further physical
harm through additional replication of HIV is the kind of exces-
sively paternalistic rationale that does not justify the invasion of
privacy that occurs when important medical procedures are per-
formed without informed consent.
There is some evidence that many hospitals and health care
providers are currently testing without acquiring the informed
consent of the patient. 53 This fact and the considerations dis-
cussed above have prompted many states to enact legislation that
requires informed consent as a prerequisite to testing for HIV.54
This is not a universal feature of AIDS legislation. 55
While the perspective of the analytical model clearly supports
a public policy of requiring informed consent, consideration must
also be given to the scope of the information disclosed to the sub-
ject. The nature of the medical and social facts of AIDS suggest
that the subject of the test generally ought to be informed about:
the purpose and meaning of the test; the sequential test proce-
dures; the confidentiality policies that apply to the test results; the
nature of AIDS and AIDS related illnesses; behavior known to in-
volve risks of transmission and contraction of HIV infection; the
benefits of early diagnosis; the availability of counseling; legal
remedies available in the state if discrimination occurs; and
the availability of anonymous testing where it is a practical
alternative.
53. See Henry, Willenbring & Crossley, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody
Testing, A Description of Practices and Policies at US Infectious Disease-Teaching Hospi-
tals and Minnesota Hospitals, 259J. A.M.A. 1819 (1988).
54. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West Supp. 1989) (con-
taining informed consent provisions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2)(a) (West
Supp. 1989) ("No person... shall perform a test designed to identify [HIV] ...
without first obtaining the informed consent of the [subject] .... "); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney Supp. 1989) ("[N]o person shall order the
performance of an HIV related test without first receiving the written, informed
consent of the subject .... ").
55. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11I 1A, para. 7308 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
(provides exception for informed consent in limited circumstances when physi-
cian authorizes HIV test of patient that has consented to medical treatment but
not to HIV test).
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Several states have specified the minimum amount of infor-
mation that must be communicated to the subject in the AIDS
statute itself.56 It is quite exceptional for the content of informed
consent to be defined in legislation. Specifying the content ac-
knowledges that the test may be ordered and administered by
someone other than a physician. It also reflects the judgment that
the personal privacy of the subject and the policy of reducing
transmission by voluntary testing requires strict regulation of
HIV information at the crucial initial information gathering stage
of testing.
There is a divergence in state laws that address the content of
informed consent. Some states, like Florida, limit required dis-
closure to medical facts. Those medical facts that must be dis-
closed are bifurcated by requiring that some facts be
communicated before the test and others communicated only
when notifying the subject of positive test results. 57 New York
requires disclosure of both medical and social facts and related
information including the scope of laws protecting infected per-
sons against discrimination. The New York statute details the in-
formation that must be disclosed and requires disclosure before
the subject's blood is drawn.58 The New York view is more con-
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2) (West Supp. 1989). See also N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2) (West Supp. 1989). This statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(c) No person shall order a test without making available to the per-
son tested, prior to the.test, information regarding measures for the
prevention of, exposure to, and transmission of human immu-
nodeficiency virus.
(e) No test result shall be revealed to the person upon whom the test
was performed without affording that person the immediate opportu-
nity for individual, face-to-face counseling about:
1. The meaning of the test results;
2. The possible need for additional testing;
3. Measures for the prevention of the transmission of the [HIV]
infection;
4. The availability in the geographic area of any appropriate health
care services, including mental health care, and appropriate social
and support services;
5. The benefits of locating and counseling any individual [who may
have infected the subject and whom the subject may have infected];
and
6. The availability . . . of the services of public health authorities . ..
[for] any individual described in subparagraph 5.
Id.
58. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(3) (McKinney Suipp. 1989). The stat-
ute provides in pertinent part:
Prior to the execution of a written informed consent, a person or-
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sistent with the underlying principles of informed consent.
Once the subject has given informed consent to an HIV test,
the results of that test ought to be available to any person that the
subject has authorized to have access. Control of who has access
to health care information outside of those immediately involved
with treatment is generally left to the subject of the information.
The right to decide who shall have access to such information is
the essence of the personal right to privacy, and if the subject has
consented to access no significant privacy interests are implicated,
at least in respect to the authorized recipient. Authorized disclo-
sure is also consistent with preserving the interest in the integrity
of the professional-patient relationship. Other important inter-
ests, such as providing for payment of insurance benefits for
treatment, may also be furthered by authorized disclosure.
In order to protect against unauthorized publication of HIV-
related information and provide protection for the subject's pri-
vacy, authorization should be in writing in non-emergency situa-
tions and the written release should contain a specific prohibition
against further disclosure, with criminal and civil sanctions if the
prohibition is violated. These are the conditions imposed in fed-
eral and state legislation for authorized disclosure of health care
information acquired in the course of drug or alcohol treatment
or treatment for mental illness. 59 Much of the recently enacted
state AIDS legislation imposes similar conditions on the author-
ized disclosure of HIV-related information. 15
dering the performance of an HIV related test shall provide to the sub-
ject of an HIV related test or, if the subject lacks capacity to consent, to
a person authorized pursuant to law to consent to health care for the
subject, an explanation of the nature of AIDS and HIV related illness,
information about discrimination problems that disclosure of the test
result could cause and legal protections against such discrimination,
and information about behavior known to pose risks for transmission
and contraction of HIV infection.
Id.
59. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.31 (1988) (records of drug and alcohol abuse). For an
example of state law imposing similar restrictions on the release form, see 4 PA.
CODE § 255.5(a)(7), (b)(l)-(5) (1986) (drug and alcohol abuse records). For
redisclosure, the federal regulations require that specific consent be procured.
See 42 C.F.R. § 2.32 (1988).
60. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1409 (Supp. 1988) (penalty of up to
$5000 and imprisonment for up to 24 months); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2782,2783 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (prohibits redisclosure without specific written
consent of subject; penalty for unauthorized redisclosure is up to $5000 per
occurrence).
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2. Disclosure of HIV-Related Information in Tort Negligence Actions
Brought Against Blood Banks or Physicians
The screening for the HIV virus in blood donations began
when an effective test for the antibody was developed in 1985.61
Since then, the screening process has substantially reduced, but
not totally eliminated, the risk of contaminated blood. Persons
who became infected from contaminated whole blood or its com-
ponents and derivatives through transfusions both prior to and
subsequent to 1985 have sued health care facilities, physicians
and blood banks in negligence and strict liability in tort or under
implied warranty theories.6 2 The vast majority of states have stat-
utorily provided immunity to suppliers of blood and blood prod-
ucts for liability without fault. 63 Courts have generally rejected
the implied warranty and strict liability claims based upon prece-
dent involving blood contaminated with the hepatitis B virus. Ac-
tions for negligence in the performance of a service have been
allowed. 6 4
61. See Kuritsky, Rastogi, Faich et al., Results of Nationwide Screening of Blood
and Plasma for Antibodies to Human T-Cell Lymphotropic III Virus, Type III, 26 TRANS-
FUSION 205 (1986). Cases of infection in hemophiliacs who were not members
of previously identified high risk groups began to be diagnosed in 1982. See
Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing 31
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 365-67 (1982) and 31 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WEEKLY REP. 652-54 (1982)), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
62. See, e.g., Doe v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Md.
1987) (plaintiff brought actions in strict liability and breach of warranty after
contracting AIDS-related complex (ARC) when blood-coagulation-factor con-
centrate was administered during emergency medical procedures); Hyland
Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 220 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1985)
(strict liability action resulting from contaminated Factor VIII blood clotting
product used to treat hemophilia).
63. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1979). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
The procurement, processing, distribution, or use of whole blood,
plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose of in-
jecting or transfusing the same, or any of them, into the human body
shall be construed to be, and is declared to be, for all purposes whatso-
ever, the rendition of a service ... and shall not be construed to be, and
is declared not to be, a sale of such ... products . . . for any purpose or
purposes whatsoever.
Id. Hyland interpreted § 1606 to apply to whole blood by-products, finding a
"legitimate state interest in manufacturing blood products." Hyland, 175 Cal.
App. 3d at 516, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
64. See, e.g., Kozup, 663 F. Supp. 1048 (granting summary judgment in favor
of defendant hospital and blood bank on strict liability and implied warranty
claims brought by parents of infant who contracted AIDS from blood transfu-
sion administered at birth); Roberts v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 73 Md. App. 1, 532
A.2d 1081 (1987) (upholding dismissal of strict liability and breach of implied
warranty claims of hemophiliacs who contracted AIDS via transfusions of con-
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The theories of lack of reasonable care vary, but in many in-
stances information about the donor is relevant to the issue of
whether the health care facility or blood bank was at fault. Prior
to the utilization of the test, plaintiffs argued that the negligence
arose from the failure to exclude blood donors who were mem-
bers of high-risk groups-gay males and IV drug users-or from
the failure to warn of the risk of infection. 65 After the use of
screening tests began, the claims focused on improper adminis-
tration of the test or on negligence in handling the information. 66
These theories are all based upon assessment of the reasonable-
ness of accepting the blood from the donor in the circumstances,
given the state-of-the-art in screening. In strict liability, implied
warranty and negligence actions, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff's infection. Con-
sequently, the identity of the donor may be central to demonstrat-
ing cause in a particular case.
Disclosure of the donor's name raises serious confidentiality
issues. Information in judicial records is potentially as public as
any information in our society." 7 Courts have registered a broad
range of responses to requests for disclosure of donors' names.
Most have demonstrated some sensitivity to the confidentiality
concerns that are presented by such requests and, by exercising
taminated blood). But cf. Miles Laboratories, 675 F. Supp. 1466 (Maryland statute
did not preclude claim in strict liability against producer of blood-coagulation-
factor).
65. See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1055-60 (example of various theories devel-
oped to demonstrate negligence prior to development of test and difficulties in
prevailing against supplier when transfusion of infected blood occurred before
1985).
66. See Liability for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
141, 148-51 (1988) (discussion of blood bank liability for failure to choose ap-
propriate testing device, incomplete performance of test and inaccurate docu-
mentation of test results).
67. Court records generally are open to the public under common law ac-
cess principles without the benefit of statutory rights to access. State and federal
court decisions have granted access to the public and media on the basis of
rights granted in the common law and Constitution as well. Publication by the
media of health care information that is contained in judicial records is pro-
tected by the first amendment. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989)
(first amendment protects newspaper from civil sanctions for publishing rape
victim's name when information was obtained lawfully from police report);
Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (giving first
amendment protection to newspaper for publishing confidential information re-
garding judicial review commission proceedings); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (first amendment protects publication of rape vic-
tim's name obtained from public judicial records). Cf Gilbert v. Medical Eco-
nomics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981) (allowing publication of physician's
name, photograph and psychiatric history).
898 [Vol. 34: p. 871
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/5
1989] CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIV-RELATED INFORMATION
their discretion in granting access to information during the dis-
covery phase, have disclosed general information without disclos-
ing the identity of the individual.68 Other courts have disclosed
the identity of the donor to the plaintiff and assumed that confi-
dentiality would be adequately protected by appropriate direc-
tions to the plaintiff restricting further unnecessary disclosure. 69
In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service,70 the Florida
Supreme Court responded to the request for disclosure of a
blood donor's name in a negligence action with an analysis that
has influenced public policy on nonconsensual disclosure of HIV-
related information in blood transfusion litigation and in civil and
criminal litigation generally. The analysis of the Rasmussen court
is a mirror image of my analytical paradigm. It dramatically illus-
trates how assumptions about social and medical facts about
AIDS and their implications to values assigned to personal pri-
vacy and public health policies drive toward strict confidentiality
protection.
In Rasmussen, access to the donor list was denied to the civil
plaintiff because disclosure would deprive the donors of their
constitutional right to informational privacy and chill prospective
blood donors from participating in the voluntary blood bank sys-
tem.7' In treating the privacy interest of the donor as having a
constitutional dimension, the Rasmussen court built upon an incip-
ient development in our legal system: high courts in a few states
had interpreted the constitutional right to informational privacy
under the federal and state constitutions to be violated by govern-
68. See Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989) (pa-
tient who had contracted HIV from contaminated blood not entitled to discover
identity of donor or to take "veiled disposition" of donor in order to establish
blood supplier's negligence).
69. See Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1987)
(patient who had contracted HIV from contaminated blood entitled to donor's
name but directed not to directly or indirectly contact donor nor undertake fur-
ther discovery regarding donor until permitted to do so by court). See also Belle
Bonfills Memorial Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
In Belle Bonfills the court authorized the plaintiff to submitt written questions to
the donor through the clerk of the court. The clerk was provided with the iden-
tity of the donor for purposes of communicating the questions and receiving the
written answers. The plaintiff received the written answers but was not provided
with the identity of the donor. Id. at 1014.
70. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
71. Id. at 537 ("Our analysis of the interests to be served by denying discov-
ery does not end with the effects of disclosure on the private lives of the fifty-one
donors implicated in this case. Society has a vital interest in maintaining a
strong volunteer blood supply .... ").
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mental disclosure of highly personal or intimate information. 72
Under this view, the degree of the invasion of privacy that
occurs when the court as an agent of the state requires disclosure
of highly intimate health care information must be weighed
against the interest in truth-seeking that would be furthered by
disclosure in the legal proceedings. In this weighing process, if
privacy interests are strong, they may trump or override the inter-
est in truth-seeking. At the very least, if the interest in truth-seek-
ing may be furthered by alternative means that do not require
that the subject's privacy be invaded, these alternatives must be
utilized. 73
In a number of instances where the identity of an infected
person is sought because it is relevant to issues in litigation, pri-
72. Id. ("We conclude, therefore, that the disclosure sought here implicates
constitutionally protected privacy interests.").
73. See Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (trac-
ing evolution of recognition of constitutional right to informational privacy).
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely held that governmental
disclosure of highly personal or intimate information violates a right to informa-
tional privacy under the Constitution that is independent of the fourth amend-
ment, dicta in several cases has suggested that a right to informational privacy
exists as part of "liberty" under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Nixon
v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (weighing President's ex-
pectation of privacy in personal correspondence against public interest in disclo-
sure); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (discussing constitutionality of
collection of patient identification data for persons using prescription
medications).
Lower courts have proceeded on the basis of the existence of this independ-
ent informational privacy right. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (There is "no question that an employee's
medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well
within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection.").
When this informational right theory is employed judicially to prevent com-
pelled disclosure of health care information, it creates a constitutionally-based
evidentiary privilege. The development of a constitutionally-based privilege has
formally occurred primarily in three states: Alaska, California and Pennsylvania.
See Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977) (prohibit-
ing reporting of individual patients' names); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-
35, 467 P.2d 557, 567-70, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839-42 (1970) (no constitutional
right allows psychotherapist to assert absolute privilege concerning all psycho-
therapeutic communications); In re "B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1976) (de-
fining constitutional right to privacy in preventing disclosure of
psychotherapist's medical records). A number of other jurisdictions have not
formally adopted the constitutional testimonial privilege but have adopted a de
facto theory by weighing interests, These courts have indirectly adopted the test,
citing Lifshultz with approval, and have discussed the role of the patient's right of
privacy in the determination regarding the privilege. See, e.g., Yoho v. Lindsley,
248 So. 2d 187, 190-92 (Fla. 1971) (balancing of rights of parties must occur in
light of doctor-patient privilege and nature of judicial proceeding); Common-
wealth v. Kobrin, 395 Mass. 284, 479 N.E.2d 674 (1985) (notions of psychother-
apist are privileged only to extent patient's interest in confidentiality outweighs
interest of state in fact finding).
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vacy may be completely protected without compromising the in-
tegrity of the truth-seeking process. In the context of negligence
actions for transfusion of contaminated blood for example, gen-
eral information about donors may be sufficient to fully develop
the theory of the case. If the identity of the donor is not disclosed
or may not be discovered from information that is disclosed,
there is no invasion of the privacy of the subject. Where the iden-
tity of an infected person is essential to resolution of an issue in a
civil or criminal case, the force of the constitutional privacy argu-
ment requires that steps be taken to minimize the loss of privacy.
These steps might include limiting disclosure of the donor's
name to the plaintiff's attorney under an obligation of confidenti-
ality and deleting any identifying data in what information is ulti-
mately placed in the court record.
Many of the state statutes reflect the privacy-weighted bal-
ancing of the Rasmussen court. The paradigm of this emerging
public policy is illustrated by the Florida and New York statutes.
These statutes generally require that the party seeking access to
protected HIV-related health care information demonstrate both
that the interest furthered by disclosure is substantial or compel-
ling and that there is no alternative means to disclosure.74 Be-
74. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2)(f) (West Supp. 1989). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
No person who has obtained or has knowledge of a test result pur-
suant to this section may disclose or be compelled to disclose the iden-
tity of any person upon whom a test is performed, or the results of such
a test in a manner which permits identification of the subject of the test,
except to the following persons:
(9) A person allowed access by a court order which is issued in com-
pliance with the following provisions:
a. No court of this state shall issue such order unless the court finds
that the person seeking the test results has demonstrated a compelling
need for the test results which cannot be accommodated by other
means. In assessing compelling need, the court shall weigh the need
for disclosure against the privacy interest of the test subject and the
public interest which may be disserved by disclosure which deters ...
donation and future [HIV]-related testing or which may lead to
discrimination.
Id. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2785 (McKinney Supp. 1989). This statute
provides in pertinent part:
A court may grant an order for disclosure of confidential HIV re-
lated information upon an application showing: (a) a compelling need
for disclosure of the information for the adjudication of a criminal or
civil proceeding; (b) a clear and imminent danger to an individual
whose life or health may unknowingly be at significant risk as a result of
contact with the individual to whom the information pertains; (c) upon
application of a state, county or local health officer, a clear and immi-
nent danger to the public health; or (d) that the applicant is lawfully
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yond that, if the information is disclosed, confidentiality is
protected in the ultimate court record by requiring the use of
pseudonyms or other methods to prevent identification of the in-
fected person. 75
These statutes and courts, following the Rasmussen approach,
reflect the appropriate public policy on judicially compelled dis-
closure of HIV-related information.
B. Hard Cases.: Contact Tracing, Notification of Sexual Partners,
Needle-Sharing Partners and Spouses
One of the hardest issues involving confidentiality and AIDS
is under what circumstances a physician or health department has
the duty or discretion to disclose the fact of infection to the
spouse, known current sexual partner, or known needle-sharing
partner of the infected person. Yet, on the surface it does not
seem like a hard case at all. If notification will prevent transmis-
sion of HIV to one of these individuals and save his or her life,
then disclosure should be mandatory. Since there is some evi-
dence of a correlation between the frequency of sexual contact
and transmission of the virus, 7" notification could prevent trans-
mission to the current sexual partner or spouse in those instances
where transmission has not yet occurred. Even where the sexual
partner is already infected, further transmission by him or her to
others might be avoided by notification. Beyond that, in view of
the discovery that AZT may retard replication of HIV in the earli-
est stages of infection, early notification may be the difference be-
tween whether the infection is treatable or not. These factors
weigh heavily toward requiring health care professionals to dis-
close the fact of a patient's infection to known sexual or needle-
sharing partners. Such disclosure is warranted as an application
of the primacy of the interest in preventing physical harm to
others.
entitled to the disclosure and the disclosure is consistent with the provi-
sions of this article.
Id. § 2785(2).
75. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2)(0(9)(b) (West Supp. 1989) ("Plead-
ings pertaining to disclosure of test results shall substitute a pseudonym for the
true name of the subject of the test."). Id.
76. See Jaffe & Lifson, Acquisition and Transmission of HI11, in 2 INFECTIOUS
DISEASE CLINICS OF N. AM. 299, 300 (June 1988) (Biologic as well as behavioral
factors may contribute to HIV transmission. Some infected persons may be
more infectious than others, and this infectiousness may vary over time."). See
also Francis & Chin, supra note 13, at 1360 ("Statistically, the fewer different
partners one has, the less likely that one will be exposed [to the HIV virus].").
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Legal precedent for requiring disclosure of health care infor-
mation by physicians to prevent further transmission of conta-
gious diseases and to protect life predated AIDS and provides
further arguments for mandatory disclosure in limited circum-
stances. Many states routinely require physicians to report conta-
gious diseases to health departments. In the case of some of
these diseases, like syphilis, contact tracing is performed by
health departments for purposes of reducing the incidence of
transmission and locating those that are infected so that they may
be treated.
Some courts imposed a common law duty in negligence upon
a physician to warn family members and health workers of the
contagious condition of a client or patient. 77 These common law
precedents were built upon and extended by the California
Supreme Court in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.78
The court extended this duty beyond infectious diseases to in-
clude mental conditions of the patient that constituted a threat of
physical harm to third parties. In Tarasoff, the court imposed a
common law duty in negligence on psychotherapists to warn third
parties of a client's specified threat to harm them if the psycho-
therapist reasonably believed the threat was likely to be carried
out.
7 9
77. See Skilling v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (physician
had duty to use care in advising patient's parents of risk of contracting scarlet
fever from contact with patient). One commentator finds Skilting not relevant
precedent in the AIDS area because the case involved the affirmative act of the
physician telling the mother that there was no risk in contact with the child. See
Note, supra note 40, at 177-78. See also Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 391, 227
S.W. 612, 614 (1921), where the court stated:
It is undoubtedly the duty of physicians who are attending patients
afflicted with contagious or infectious diseases not to negligently do any
act that would tend to spread the infections. It would likewise be their
duty to exercise reasonable care to advise members of the family and
others, who are liable to be exposed thereto, of the nature of the dis-
ease and the danger of exposure.
Id.
78. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
79. California decisions following the case have limited the duty to warn to
the facts of Tarasoff. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,
614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980). In Thompson, a juvenile delinquent,
within 24 hours after being released to the custody of his mother, sexually as-
saulted and murdered the plaintiff's son. Id. at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 72. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the county had acted negli-
gently in releasing from its psychiatric care ajuvenile delinquent who was known
to have "latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young
children" and who had "indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a
young child residing in the neighborhood." Id. Despite the complaint's allega-
tions, the California Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's case and concluded
that the county had no duty to warn since the defendant made no "prior
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Are cases involving notification of HIV-related information
sufficiently different from infectious disease notification cases and
Tarasoff to consider adopting policies other than mandatory notifi-
cation? There is a strong case for treating notification of HIV
status differently. Disclosure without consent constitutes a seri-
ous invasion of privacy and involves risks of adverse conse-
quences to the patient, such as discrimination or violence,
through further publication by the sexual partner. Mandatory
disclosure may also exacerbate psychiatric disorders caused by in-
fection.80 Unless the patient is informed by the professional that
HIV status would be disclosed to known current contacts at risk,
disclosure threatens the trust necessary for free communication
and the integrity of the professional-patient relationship. If the
patient is informed of contact notification, he or she may be de-
terred from being tested. Third-party notification might save
some lives in the short run but, in the long run, if it damages the
trust between professional and client, and deters persons from
voluntary testing, more transmission and deaths may result.
Also, unlike the Tarasoff situation, the health professional is
threat[s] to a specific identifiable victim." Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 80.
Other courts have somewhat extended the duty to warn. See, e.g., Mavroudis
v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1980)
(therapist has duty to protect potential victim from danger presented by patient
once therapist determines, or reasonably should have determined victim's iden-
tity upon a "moments reflection"). See also Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497
F. Supp. 185, 194 (D. Neb. 1980) (doctor's liability extends to those individuals
foreseeably endangered by patient, not just those whom patient may have specif-
ically threatened); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 705-06, 669 P.2d
41, 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805, 810-11 (1983) (therapist held liable for failing to
warn identifiable potential victim and her minor child, since risk of harm to mi-
nor was reasonably foreseeable if patient attacked victim); Petersen v. State, 100
Wash. 2d 421, 428-29, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (1983) (psychiatrist who knew of pa-
tient's drug-related mental problems and that patient was "potentially danger-
ous person and that his behavior would be unpredictable," held liable for failing
to petition court for 90-day commitment of patient when patient injured plaintiff
while driving under influence).
However, courts have generally been restrained in recognizing and defining
the scope of the duty, and in most cases adjudicated on the Tarasoff theory, the
plaintiff has not prevailed against the psychotherapist.
80. For a useful examination of the factors that distinguish disclosure issues
in HIV cases from Tarasoff and the infectious disease notification cases, see Note,
supra note 40. See also Herman & Gagliano, AIDS, Therapeutic Confidentiality, and
Warning Third Parties, 48 MD. L. REV. 55 (1989). In this useful article, Herman
and Gagliano argue against the imposition of a mandatory duty to disclose on
physicians and therapists. They also make the important point that discretionary
disclosure provides the flexibility that provides the best opportunity for accom-
modating the various interests that arise in the broad contexts where notification
of HIV status may arise. Id. at 69-75.
[Vol. 34: p. 871
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not the only potential source of notification to the third party.
The infected person and the health department are both in the
position to notify third parties, and the infected person is argua-
bly in a better position to do so. Only the subject knows who is at
risk. The physician may only know that a spouse is at risk. Im-
posing a duty upon the physician to discover those that may be
sexually involved with the patient requires the physician to under-
take a police-type activity that many are reluctant to perform and
that ought not to be imposed.
Imposing notification duties on the physician also may not be
especially efficacious given the medical facts of the disease. Since
some infected persons are asymptomatic for up to seven years,
notification of potential retrospective contacts and their potential
contacts is only theoretically possible and obviously unrealistic.
Notification without proper counseling may also result in harm to
the contact or further unnecessary disclosure with significant ad-
verse consequences to the infected individual. These differences
have resulted in a reluctance on the part of legislatures and health
departments to treat AIDS or HIV infection as analogous to other
infectious diseases or dangerous health conditions for purposes
of notifying current sexual partners or other high-risk contacts.
Although all states require that physicians notify health depart-
ments of AIDS, most do not require similar notification of HIV
infection, and only a few states are treating AIDS like other dis-
eases and requiring contact tracing.
The possibility of significant tort damage awards for disclo-
sure under breach of confidentiality theories8 I and the lack of
clarity in the existing law on the duty to disclose to contacts leave
the health care professional between a rock and a hard place. The
special dimensions of the dilemma of the health professional has
produced legislation that specifically deals with the notification
81. There is considerable precedent for allowing a patient or client to re-
cover tort damages for unauthorized extra-legal disclosure by a health care pro-
fessional of confidential information. The leading cases are: Hammonds v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (physician
liable to patient when physician turned medical records over to attorney without
patient's consent); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (physi-
cian liable to patient for disclosing health care information to patient's em-
ployer); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (physician not
liable for revealing confidential information when claim has been made and pub-
lic interest in honest and just result outweighs patient's right to nondisclosure).
Various legal theories are raised in support of recovery in these cases. The most
pervasive one is the breach of fiduciary theory. See Note, Breach of Coinfidence: An
Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982); Turkington, supra note 6, at 383-
86.
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question. Many of these laws provide the physician with discre-
tion to disclose in limited circumstances and immunize the physi-
cian from liability if they exercise the discretion either to disclose
or not to disclose. The circumstances and scope of contacts that
may be notified under the various laws differs. The three basic
approaches are illustrated by the Florida, New York and Georgia
statutes.
Florida limits discretionary notification to the patient's
spouse, allowing disclosure only if the patient has refused to no-
tify after the health professional has recommended that the pa-
tient does so.8 2 New York provides for discretionary notification
to spouses, sex partners or persons identified as having shared
hypodermic needles or syringes with the infected person, pro-
vided that the physician has counseled the individual about notifi-
cation but reasonably believes that the individual will not inform
the contact. New York requires that notification be accompanied
by counseling and gives the infected person the option of having
the health department notify without disclosing the identity of the
infected person. 83 Georgia allows for discretionary disclosure to
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2416 (West Supp. 1989). This statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
(1) A practitioner regulated through the Division of Medical Quality
Assurance of the department shall not be civilly or criminally liable for
the disclosure of otherwise confidential information under the follow-
ing circumstances:
(a) If a patient of the practitioner has tested positive for [HIVI dis-
closes to the practitioner the identity of a spouse;
(b) The practitioner recommends the patient notify the spouse of the
positive test and refrain from engaging in sexual activity in a manner
likely to transmit the virus and the patient refuses; and
(c) If pursuant to a perceived civil duty or the ethical guidelines of the
profession, the practitioner reasonably and in good faith advises the
spouse of the patient of the positive test and facts concerning the trans-
mission of the virus.
Id.
83. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989). This stat-
ute provides in pertinent part:
A physician may disclose confidential HIV-related information
under the following conditions:
(1) disclosure is made to a contact or to a public health officer for the
purpose of making the disclosure to said contact; and
(2) the physician reasonably believes disclosure is medically appropri-
ate and there is a significant risk of infection to the contact; and
(3) the physician has counseled the protected individual regarding the
need to notify the contact, and the physician reasonably believes the
protected individual will not inform the contact; and
(4) the physician has informed the protected individual of his or her
intent to make such disclosure to a contact and has given the protected
individual the opportunity to express a preference as to whether disclo-
sure should be made by the physician directly or to a public health of-
906 [Vol. 34: p. 871
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the spouse, sexual partner or their children after first attempting
to notify the infected person that such disclosure is going to be
made.8 4
Many states have not addressed the question of notification
of at-risk contacts. In such states, because precedent on disclo-
sure of other health care information may not be controlling,
health professionals are at risk of significant liability even if they
take action consistent with their professional ethics and judgment
as to what is medically and therapeutically correct for their pa-
tient. This is an unacceptable situation. The conflicting and im-
portant values that face off in notification cases require that:
(1) the physician or health professional be provided limited dis-
cretion to disclose when there has been an opportunity for the
infected person to notify the high-risk contact but there is reason
to believe they will not do so; (2) discretionary disclosure to cur-
rent known high risk contacts, including sexual and needle-shar-
ing partners, be allowed; and (3) notification be accompanied by
counseling. The New York statute reflects the policy that best
weighs the interest in preventing transmission with that of pre-
serving confidentiality. The imposition on physicians of
mandatory duties to disclose does not. The risk of significant dis-
ruption of the professional-patient relationship is too great. If
mandatory disclosure does occur, the hope of controlling the dis-
ease by acquiring pertinent information for research and treat-
ment and by encouraging voluntary testing will be lost.
V. CONCLUSION
The medical and social facts about AIDS have projected the
need to protect the confidentiality of HIV-related health care in-
formation into a prominent place in current public policy. Confi-
dentiality is needed not only to prevent the risk of serious
ficer for the purpose of said disclosure . . . [and] the physician shall
honor such preference.
Id.
84. GA. CODE ANN. § 2 4-9 -4 7 (g) (Supp. 1989). The Georgia statute pro-
vides in pertinent part:
When the patient of a physician has been determined to be in-
fected with HIV and that patient's physician reasonably believes that
the spouse or sexual partner or any child of the patient, spouse, or sex-
ual partner is a person at risk of being infected with HIV by that pa-
tient, the physician may disclose to that spouse, sexual partner, or child
that the patient has been determined to be infected with HIV, after first
attempting to notify the patient that such disclosure is going to be
made.
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invasions of privacy that occur from disclosure, but also as a
means for controlling the epidemic by encouraging voluntary
testing. In this article I have proposed a general analytical system
for determining whether, in particular cases, breaches of confi-
dentiality for HIV-related information are appropriate. This in-
cludes identifying the extent to which personal privacy and the
trust essential for preserving the integrity of the professional-cli-
ent relationship are implicated if confidentiality were to be
breached, and weighing the extent to which access to HIV-related
information is necessary to further important interests. Given the
medical and social facts about AIDS, powerful reasons support
providing strict confidentiality for HIV-related information in or-
der to protect privacy and preserve trust in professional-client re-
lationships. In some instances important interests like preventing
physical harm to others are furthered by disclosing HIV-related
information. These hard cases may ultimately require disclosure.
I suggest that notification of sexual or needle-sharing partners is
such a case, and that providing discretionary disclosure by physi-
cians to third parties in prescribed circumstances constitutes the
best accommodation of conflicting values. I also consider cases
where confidentiality may be preserved and sufficient information
disclosed to protect private interests. Where this occurs the an-
swer is easy: protect confidentiality.
908 [Vol. 34: p. 871
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/5
